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ABSTRACT
Most US federal environmental policies allow states to assume responsibility for implementation
and enforcement of regulations; states with this responsibility are referred to as ``authorized'' or
having ``primacy.'' Although such decentralization may have benefits, it may also have costs with
pollution spillovers across states. This paper estimates these costs empirically by studying the free
riding of states authorized under the Clean Water Act. The analysis examines water quality in rivers
around the US and includes fixed effects for the location where water quality is monitored to address
unobserved geographic heterogeneity. The estimated equations suggest that free riding gives rise
to a 4% degradation of water quality downstream of authorized states, with an environmental cost





New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1248
and NBER
sigman@econ.rutgers.eduPublic policies for pollution control in the United States are a hybrid of centralized standard
setting and decentralized implementation and enforcement. Some observers question the efﬁciency
of centralization and argue for greater decentralization of environmental decision-making. Decen-
tralization may allow policies to vary more with their local beneﬁts and costs: although centralized
policies could contain local variation, federal authorities may ﬁnd much variability politically difﬁ-
cult and may have less information than state authorities. However, decentralization may be costly
if the federal government can realize economies of scale in expertise, if “a race to the bottom” in
environmental quality occurs as states compete for new investment, or if there are transboundary
spillovers and states free ride.1
This study evaluates the empirical relevance of the latter concern about decentralized environ-
mental policy. In particular, it examines whether states that control their Clean Water Act (CWA)
programs free ride on downstream states. States received this control — known as “authorization”
— over their programs at different times. Using data on in-stream water pollution levels at about
500 river monitoring stations around the country from the National Stream Quality Accounting
Network (NASQAN), I estimate equations that model water quality at a station as a function of
whether the state or any upstream neighbor has authority over its CWA program, time-varying state
and river characteristics, and a monitoring-station ﬁxed effect for unobserved geographic hetero-
geneity. The paper uses a water quality index (WQI) based on levels of ﬁve common pollutants.
A few empirical recent papers examine interstate free riding in environmental policy. Gray and
Shadbegian (2004) analyze the emissions of pollutants by pulp and paper plants and ﬁnd evidence
of higher water and air pollution when out-of-state residents receive a larger share of the beneﬁts of
pollution control. They also examine monitoring activities, but ﬁnd no evidence of border effects
there. Helland and Whitford (2003) ﬁnd toxic chemical releases to be higher in border counties,
which they interpret as evidence of spillovers.
1For recent discussions of federalism in environmental policy, see CBO (1997), Oates (2000), and Revesz (1997).
Dinan et al. (1999) provide an example of the costs of uniform federal standards in the Safe Drinking Water Act. A
substantial literature on the “race to the bottom” includes Levinson (2003), List and Gerking (2001), Markusen et al.
(1995), Oates and Schwab (1988), and Wilson (1996).
1My study builds on this research in several ways.2 Examining the effects of authorization
offers some econometric advantages. The identiﬁcation of the coefﬁcients comes from changes in
policies over time, allowing the estimated equations to include ﬁxed effects for the location where
water quality is measured. Earlier studies of free riding are identiﬁed only by geography and
thus potentially confounded by other heterogeneity associated with proximity to state borders. For
example, locations near borders, such as along the Mississippi River, may have higher populations
and different economic activities than other locations, even within the same region. In addition, for
a coefﬁcient of particular interest in the current study, identiﬁcation comes entirely from changes
in the status of a neighboring state, thus reducing concerns about policy endogeneity.
Examining the effects of authorization not only helps to establish that the border effects are
free riding, but also provides information on the mechanism through which free riding occurs. It
provides an assessment of the type of decentralization that most federal environmental programs
employ.
I examine effects on in-stream water quality, which offers advantages and disadvantages rel-
ative to earlier studies. Water quality captures free riding regardless of the source of pollution.
For example, if free riding states are less strict with municipal water treatment facilities than with
industrial polluters (which may have out-of-state ownership), earlier studies may miss this effect
by focusing on industrial pollution only. On the other hand, in-stream water quality does not indi-
cate whether permitting, monitoring, or enforcement provide the ﬂexibility that makes free riding
possible.
My results suggest that states do free ride when authorized. The water quality index is 4%
lower at stations downstream from an authorized state than at other stations. When rivers form a
border between states, authorization of at least one of the states lowers the water quality index by
6%, although the latter effect is not robust. To interpret the magnitude of these effects, I use earlier
estimates of willingness to pay for freshwater quality to construct a rough measure of the costs of
2A small literature also examines free riding across international borders (Sigman, 2002; Murdoch, et al., 1997).
Like the previous literature examining interstate spillovers, this international literature relies on geographic variation
only. Thus, the current research differs from this research methodologically, by allowing ﬁxed effects, and conceptu-
ally, by focusing on free riding in a federal systems, where safeguards against free riding should be in place.
2this free riding. This calculation suggests that the environmental cost of free riding at downstream
stations was $17 million in 1983.
The paper begins with brief background on US water pollution policy that describes the au-
thorization process and identiﬁes sources of state discretion. The second section discusses the
data on water quality and the explanatory variables. The third section presents the estimated equa-
tions, which account for station ﬁxed effects and clustering within riversheds. The fourth section
provides some welfare calculations. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of these
results for federalism in environmental policies.
1 State discretion in water pollution policy
US federal water pollution regulation originally gave states considerable discretion (Freeman,
2000). However, over time Congress centralized the regulation, culminating in the Clean Water
Act of 1972. Under CWA, point source polluters must obtain permits that set numerical efﬂuent
limitations for various pollutants. For each production process, the federal government speciﬁes
the pollution control technologies and water quality standards that form the basis for these efﬂuent
limitations. Facilities had to meet the ﬁrst efﬂuent limitations in 1977 and a more restrictive set by
1983.
EPA authorizes states to issue and enforce permits. When the state does not have this authority,
the regional EPA ofﬁce issues permits. States received authorization at different times. Figure 1
presents the authorization years by state. Most states obtained authorization early, with a few that
authorized in 1973, the ﬁrst year of the NASQAN data. However, a number of states authorized
in the late 1970s and 1980s, in the middle of these data. Seven states had not authorized by 1995,
the last year of the data. Sigman (2003) explores various hypotheses about the determinants of
authorization, such as green preferences, private information, and regulatory economies of scale,
and ﬁnds no single overriding cause.







Figure 1: Clean Water Act authorization years
gations, this action is politically and legally difﬁcult and ﬁnancially costly for the regional EPA.
For example, Arkansas refuses to impose federal discharge limits and monitoring requirements
for municipal water pollution sources because they are too strict (GAO, 1996). The regional EPA
ofﬁce says its “only recourse would be to take back responsibility for the program — an unrealistic
option (GAO, 1996, p. 6).” Thus, once authorized, states have quite a free hand to conduct (or
ignore) the program.
Even if authorized states follow the program, they have several forms of discretion that might
allow them to free ride. First, the federal technology and water quality standards do not greatly
constrain thestates in writingthe numerical efﬂuentlimitations in permits. GAO (1996) documents
a variation in permit levels for similar size municipal treatment works of several orders of mag-
nitude. These variations may arise through interpretation of the technology standards or through
the environmental modelling required to implement water quality standards. EPA long delayed
issuing technology standards, allowing state authorities to use “best professional judgement” in
the interim, which may be much of the period of this study for some facilities.
Second, authorized states have primary enforcement authority under CWA. In ﬁscal year 1995,
4states conducted 81% of CWA inspections and undertook 77% of the administrative actions against
violators (EPA, 1996 and 1997). Although the regional EPA may step in if a state fails to take
action against a violator, control of inspections and enforcement may give states the ability to
direct resources toward the problems they regard as most pressing.
Downstream states do complain about upstream states’ implementation. For example, GAO
(1996) relates a challenge from Oklahoma of a permit issued to an Arkansas municipal treatment.
Bartlett (1995) describes complaints and law suits from Tennessee about proposed permits for a
Champion Paper plant just upstream in North Carolina. However, one would expect states to lobby
on their own behalf, so these complaints do not prove the existence of free riding.
2 Data and model
This section describes the data on water quality in rivers and the policy and other explanatory
variables that have been merged with these water quality data.
2.1 Water quality data
TheNationalStreamQualityAccountingNetwork, maintainedbytheUSGeologicSurvey(USGS),
contains measurements of 121 different water quality parameters at 618 monitoring stations on
rivers in the United States (Alexander et al., 1998). The data span 1973 to 1995, with the most
stations operating in 1980 and considerably fewer at the beginning and end of the period. Most sta-
tions report data approximately monthly during the period they operate, but this frequency varies.
Regional USGS labs conduct most the sampling and analysis.3
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of NASQAN stations in the coterminous US. The stations are
spread across the country with the intent of providing a picture of human impact on water quality
3A very small number (under 1%) of the observations are conducted by state agencies, for which there might be
concerns about strategic reporting. A dummy for these observations did not have a statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient,
nor did interactions of this dummy with the policy variables. Thus, strategic reporting does not appear to be a major
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Figure 2: NASQAN river monitoring stations in the coterminous United States
in major rivers. They are typically located at the bottom of watersheds, as deﬁned by the USGS’s
watershed classiﬁcation system.
With pollution measurements from NASQAN, I calculate the EPA’s water quality index, based
on ﬁve major pollutants: dissolved oxygen, fecal coliform, total suspended solids, phosphorous,
and nitrogen. The calculation involves a nonlinear translation of each pollution level into a severity
index and then a weighted aggregation of these indices (McClelland, 1974).4
This index provides an overall picture of environmental conditions in the river, reﬂecting ex-
perts’ judgements about the effects of pollution on the use of the river. It assists in drawing welfare
implications of the empirical results because it can be mapped into willingness to pay estimates.
The pollutants that are the basis for the index are very common; several principally result from
sewage and animal waste and others from fertilizer use (Meybeck et al., 1990). Thus, they should
not be especially sensitive to heterogeneity in the mix of industrial activity, unlike, for example,
4The original EPA index included twelve different pollutants; I have reweighted to include only these ﬁve on
which NASQAN provides relatively thick data. EPA’s recent studies using this index conduct a similar reweighting
(e.g., EPA, 2002).
6heavymetals. Inaddition, thesepollutantshavebeenthefocusofthemostregulatoryefforts, which
is important to assessing the free riding hypothesis. If states always choose the corner solution of
no pollution control, they cannot increase their pollution even if they desire to free ride. Thus,
regulatory efforts suggest that at least some states do not choose the corner solution and may free
ride.
I classify water quality based on average pollution levels for measurements taken during the
summer months (deﬁned as May through September). Constructing a daily WQI gives far fewer
observations because not all pollutants are measured on a given day, even though all may be mea-
sured several times over the course of the summer. Previous studies have used summer averages,
starting with the pioneering work by Vaughan and Russell (1982).
Table 1 presents the water quality levels at stations on intrastate and interstate rivers. The total
number of stations in Table 1 and the subsequent empirical analyses is 501, smaller than the 618
in NASQAN because of several exclusions for missing or ill-deﬁned data.5 The average WQI
is about 60. Rivers with this WQI would be considered ﬁshable, but slightly below the cutoff
for swimmable, according to thresholds used in the welfare analysis below. A recent run of the
EPA’s water quality model ﬁnds an average WQI per mile of river of about 75 (EPA, 2002), so
the water quality in this sample is poorer. This difference should not be surprising because the
NASQAN data are earlier (and the estimates below suggest signiﬁcant improvement over time)
and intentionally overrepresent rivers near populated areas.
AsreportedinTable1, waterqualityissomewhatbetterinintrastateriversthaninterstaterivers.
Although this pattern is consistent with free riding, intrastate and interstate observations differ in
many other ways that may explain the disparity. In particular, intrastate observations are mostly in
coastal states, with the exception of a few on river systems that ﬂow into inland sinks in the desert
Southwest. Interstate observations may be in coastal or landlocked states.
5Stations were excluded if they never measured all of the pollutants necessary to calculate the WQI for a summer.
Stations outside the contiguous United States were excluded for lack of population data. Eleven stations that never
measured ﬂow in the same summer as pollution were excluded. Three stations in the Great Lakes were also excluded
to restrict the sample to rivers; the results were not sensitive to this exclusion. In addition, 16 stations downstream
of Mexico or Canada were excluded because their upstream authorization status and LCV scores cannot be deﬁned.
Again, the results are not sensitive this exclusion.
7Table 1: Means and standard deviations of variables for intrastate and interstate observations
Intrastate Interstate
Obs=836 (18%) Obs=3869 (82%)
Stations= Stations=
102 (20%) 399 (80%)
Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.)
Water quality index 60.8 9.5 58.7 10.5
Locations:
Station upstream of state border – – .809 –
Distance to border (miles) – – 80 (111)
Station within 50 miles upstream of state border – – .422 –
Station downstream of state border – – .578 –
Distance to border (miles) – – 83 (140)
Station within 50 miles downstream of state border – – .184 –
Station on state border – – .140 –
Authorization:
State authorized .559 – .680 –
Upstream state authorized – – .667 –
(if downstream station)
Socioeconomic variables:
Personal income per capita (thousand 1995 dollars) 20.75 (3.22) 19.66 (2.78)
League of Conservation Voters (LCV) score 46.1 (15.2) 46.1 (17.4)
Percent cropland in watershed 12.2 (12.5) 22.2 (19.6)
Percent urban land in watershed 10.4 (12.7) 6.05 (7.47)
River physical characteristics:
Flow (cu ft/sec) 2123 (4223) 13990 (60325)
Temperature (degrees C) 23.1 (4.5) 21.8 (4.0)
Note: Standard deviations reported for continuous variables only.
82.2 Explanatory variables
Water quality at a given monitoring station is a function of pollution inputs as a river ﬂows down-









where H indicates the headwaters, pht indicates pollution inputs at upstream locations h, and fht
is the ﬂow that dilutes these inputs. The effect of upstream pollution inputs diminishes through
natural attenuation, represented here for simplicity by a constant δ (with δ < 1).
We do not have direct information about pollution inputs or attenuation rates, but know some
of the factors on which these depend. For pollution at location h,
pht = uht(yht,Lht)−aht(ght,yht,Sht) (2)
where uncontrolled pollution, uht, depends on factors such as the level of economic activity, yht,
and land use, Lht. These uncontrolled pollution levels may be reduced by the application of costly
pollution control, aht. The extent of abatement may depend on green preferences ght, income (yht
again), and policy variables, Sht, such as authorization status. The potential for free riding enters
here in this analysis.6 The natural attenuation variable δ is also a function of some observable
variables, particularly the temperature of the river, mit.
Ideally, therefore, the equations would characterize both local and upstream conditions. In
practice, the ability to measure upstream conditions depends on the variable. The values for land
use describe the watershed and thus do characterize local and upstream conditions (as a result,
these variables are denoted Lh
it below). For variables that change at state boundaries, such as
authorization status and income, the equations can include the upstream state’s value. For some
variables, however, such as the river ﬂow and temperature, the value at the station is the only
6Free riding could also affect the uncontrolled pollution level through land use or industrial siting decisions. How-
ever, authorization will not change these behaviors, so this mechanism is not explored here.
9indication we have of upstream conditions.
Therefore, we have an equation in which water quality at station i is a function of local and
upstream variables. A reduced form equation for these relationships is
WQit = G(Sit,Sht,yit,yht,git,ght,Lh
it, fit,mit,Ai) (3)
where variables are represented at station i and at upstream locations, h, when possible. All the
estimated equations also include a station-speciﬁc ﬁxed effect, Ai, to address heterogeneity across
states and stations that might be correlated with the policy variables.
2.2.1 Policy variables
The principal policy variables, Sit and Sht, depend upon whether states are authorized to conduct
their own permitting and enforcement activities under CWA. States had this authority in 65% of the
observations in the sample. The empirical analysis examines the interaction between authorization
and location, speciﬁcally if the location is subject to free riding.
Three different location variables were coded by mapping the NASQAN stations using a Ge-
ographic Information System. These variables indicate whether the station is upstream of a state
border, downstream of a border, or located on a river when it forms a border between two states.7
The location variables are based on river systems rather than the name of the river; for example,
if a station is on a tributary that ﬂows into the main river before the river crosses a border, the
station would be coded as upstream. Many stations fall into all three interstate categories. Table
1 reports that 81% of interstate observations (67% of the total) are upstream of a border, 58% are
downstream of a border, and 14% are on border rivers.
The table also reports the distance from the station to the nearest upstream or downstream bor-
der, which may be important because of natural attenuation. The average distance is 80 miles for
upstream observations and 83 miles for downstream observations. A variable used in the regres-
7Several stations are upstream of the Great Lakes (even after stations the Great Lakes are excluded, see footnote
5). The point at which a river enters the Great Lakes is treated as a downstream state boundary because the Lakes
represent a shared resource.
10sions later indicates whether stations are relatively close to borders (deﬁned as within 50 miles).
42% of interstate observations are within 50 miles of a downstream border and 18% are within 50
miles of an upstream border.
The measures of potential to free ride are calculated from a combination of authorization status
and the station’s location. Three measures are constructed. For stations located downstream of
borders, the measure is whether the upstream state was authorized. Authorized upstream states
have the discretion and motivation to choose less abatement, resulting in higher pollution down-
stream. Downstream states, ﬁnding themselves the recipient of higher pollution, may adjust their
own controls upward. However, with the usual curvature assumptions on costs and beneﬁts of
pollution control, states will respond to a higher pollution endowment partly by tolerating higher
pollution.
For stations located upstream of a border, the measure is an interaction of upstream status and
authorization status. Because the equations also include a variable for authorization, this inter-
action term picks up the differential effect of authorization when the state can free ride. Finally,
when the station is on the border, the measure is a dummy variable that equals one if either state is
authorized; this variable indicates that at least one state might free ride.8
As with any study of the effects of policy variation, nonrandom assignment of policies raises
some concern about the estimated effects. The current study addresses this concern in a few ways.
First, monitoring-station ﬁxed effects should absorb cross sectional heterogeneity — including
attributes of the state, such as state willingness to enforce regulations — that may cause early or
late authorization. Second, for downstream stations, the policy variable characterizes a different
state than the one in which water quality is being measured, which should limit the extent to which
unobserved time-series heterogeneity in the state can explain both the policy variable and the water
quality. Finally, even for observations in the state of the policy variable, we are not interested in the
level of water quality before and after authorization, but the difference in these levels at stations
8The equations were also run with the addition of a second variable for borders indicating that both states (as
opposed to at least one) were authorized. This variable never entered with a statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient and is
not shown here for clarity.
11upstream of borders. Although several factors might link overall water quality levels with the
time of authorization, it is more difﬁcult to think of factors beside free riding that would result in
differentiallevelsattheseupstreamstations, especiallywiththegeographicheterogeneityabsorbed
by ﬁxed effects.
2.2.2 Other explanatory variables
Several additional variables provide time-varying determinants of pollution releases or their impact
of water quality. For yit, annual state-level personal income data from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis have been converted to 1995 dollars using the national CPI. As Table 1 reports, income is
slightly higher for intrastate observations, reﬂecting a difference between coastal and other states.
For stations on border rivers, the arbitrary choice of measuring state should not inﬂuence the value
of state characteristics, so all state characteristics, such as income, average the two neighbors’
values.
The measure of environmental preferences, git, is the average League of Conservation Voters
(LCV) score for the House delegation of the state in a given year. The LCV score (which ranges
from 0 to 100) represents the share of a legislator’s votes on selected measures that the LCV
considers pro-environment (LCV, 2004; Sharp, 1988). As a measure of environmental sentiment,
LCV scores have the virtue of varying over time and of perhaps reﬂecting the position of the
median voter in the state (in contrast, for example, to environmental group membership, which
focuses on the upper tail).9 I use House rather than Senate scores because the House scores usually
average more individual legislators’ data than Senate scores, reducing noise, and also can adjust
more rapidly to changes in sentiment. As Table 1 reports, the LCV scores are similar between
intrastate and interstate observations.
Local land use, Lh
it, is an important determinant of water quality because of the effects of
nonpoint sources of pollution, such as agricultural and urban stormwater runoff. To capture these
9LCV scores are potentially endogenous to water quality in the state, for example, if poor environmental perfor-
mance causes a voters to select greener candidates. However, this concern may be somewhat allayed by the fact that
the LCV scores pertain to federal ofﬁce holders, whose control over local environmental is indirect at best.
12pollution sources, the equations include estimates of percent of land in cropland and in urban uses
in the 8-digit HUC watershed in which the station is located. Stations are largely located at the base
of these watersheds, so this measure should be a summary of upstream conditions. The land use
dataareavailableeveryﬁveyears, beginningin1983, fromtheDepartmentofAgriculture’sNatural
Resources Inventory (NRI). I linearly interpolated values in years between the NRI surveys and
extrapolated backward linearly to years before 1983. Table 1 shows that interstate watersheds had
a much higher share of land in cropland and lower share in urban uses than intrastate watersheds.
These differences result from the predominance of coastal states in the intrastate group.
The equations also include two river characteristics. The river’s ﬂow, fit is included to capture
dilution and ﬂooding, which greatly increases non-point source pollution in rivers. Not surpris-
ingly, Table 1 reports that stations on interstate river systems have dramatically more ﬂow than
intrastate stations. Water temperature, mit, is included in the estimated equations because it affects
biological activity and chemical conditions in the river and thus the natural attenuation rates of
pollutants. Both ﬂow and temperature are included in the measures collected by NASQAN on
about the same schedule as the pollutant concentrations.
3 Results
In the estimates in Table 2, the log of WQI depends on the logs of the explanatory variables. A log-
log form was chosen to conform to physical water quality models that have multiplicative effects
of variables such as ﬂow and temperature. All equations include a ﬁxed effect for the monitoring
station: Hausman tests reject random effects.
Because stations are on river systems in which one station may be upstream of another, errors
may be correlated across stations during the same summer. To account for these correlations, the
standard errors of the equations are estimated with clustering of contemporaneous observations
within the USGS hydrologic subregion.10 Although these estimates are potentially inefﬁcient in
10The subregions correspond to 4-digit Hydrologic Unit Codes (HUCs) and there are 222 in the country. The results
are not noticeably different if clustering is at 2-digit (region) or 6-digit (accounting unit) HUC levels.
13not modeling the upstream-downstream relationships precisely, they also make the equations ro-
bust to some other spatial relationships that may arise in the data, such as watershed-level planning
in setting permit stringency.
This section discusses the coefﬁcients on the policy-related variables ﬁrst and other covariates
later.
3.1 Policy-related coefﬁcients
The ﬁrst column in Table 2 presents estimates of the basic equation. The equation includes whether
the state of the monitoring station is authorized along with several interactions of location and
authorization status. The coefﬁcient on own-state authorization is positive; however, it is substan-
tively very small and not statistically signiﬁcant in any of the equations in Table 2. Thus, the
results do not suggest a strong time-series association between water quality and authorization,
either from authorized states creating better (or worse) water quality or from the EPA granting au-
thorization to states once they begin to achieve good results. However, authorization is associated
with better water quality when the equation does not include state or station effects.
The next variable is an interaction between this authorization status variable and upstream-of-
border location. The variable is included to measure whether authorized states use their privileges
to free ride on downstream neighbors. This interaction does not enter with a statistically signiﬁcant
coefﬁcient. The point estimate is positive, however, which would could arise if states free ride by
shifting polluting activity to very near the border, resulting in an improvement upstream in all but
the last few miles.11
11This “shifting” hypothesis suggests upstream state authorization should cause river water quality to fall more
dramatically as a river ﬂows downstream than it would with federal authority. To test this hypothesis, I identiﬁed 52
pairsofupstreamanddownstreamstationswithastateborderbetweenthem. Ofthesestations, 32haddataatleastonce
in the same year, resulting in 203 observations on the change in water quality between upstream and downstream states
(DWQI). Regressing DWQI on the distance between the two stations (DIST) and the upstream state’s authorization
(UPSTAUTH) yields
DWQI = 3.18(3.67)−.012(.011)DIST −1.47(3.55)UPSTAUTH,
where numbers in parentheses are standard errors adjusted for clustering at the station-pair level. Although the point
estimate on upstream state authorization is negative, the equation offers little support for the shifting hypothesis.
14Table 2: Estimates of determinants of water quality with station ﬁxed effects
Dependent var: log(WQI)
(1) (2) (3)
State authorized .0070 .0114 .0008
(.0147) (.0195) (.0135)
Upstream * authorized .0373 – .1501
(.0283) (.0668)
Upstream * authorized * LCV score – – -.0298
(.0168)
Within 50 miles upstream * authorized – .1265 –
(.0705)
Downstream * upstream state authorized -.0401 – -.0613
(.0160) (.0559)
Downstream * upstream state authorized * – – .0063
upstream state LCV score (.0155)
Within 50 miles downstream * upstream state – -.0270 –
authorized (.0127)
Border * at least one state authorized -.0584 -.0380 -.0584
(.0208) (.0270) (.0202)
Log(State income) -.0155 -.0055 -.0185
(.0716) (.0715) (.0715)
Log(League of Conservation Voters score) .0041 .0072 .0156
(.0078) (.0081) (.0089)
Downstream * Log(Upstream state income) .0476 – .0464
(.0667) (.0664)
Downstream * Log(Upstream state LCV) .0078 – .0035
(.0056) (.0152)
Within 50 miles downstream * Log(Upstream income) – .00002 –
(.00005)
Within 50 miles downstream * Log(Upstream LCV) – -.0075 –
(.0162)
Log(Urban land share) -.0503 -.0510 -.0471
(.0334) (.0344) (.0332)
Log(Cropland share) -.0037 -.0048 -.0043
(.0161) (.0164) (.0161)
Log(Flow) -.0322 -.0319 -.0320
(.0041) (.0041) (.0041)
Log(Temperature) .0295 .0314 .0289
(.0322) (.0322) (.0321)
Year .0056 .0057 .0055
(.0013) (.0013) (.0013)
R-squared (including station effects) .629 .629 .630
R-squared (within only) .098 .099 .099
Notes: All equations include station ﬁxed effects.
Standard errors (in parentheses) robust to contemporaneous clustering at the watershed level.
Number of observations: 4704; Number of stations: 501.
15The coefﬁcient on being downstream from an authorized state is negative and statistically sig-
niﬁcant, which is consistent with free riding.12 The point estimate suggests a 4% reduction in
the water quality index. Because the WQI is an abstract measure, the next section provides an
attempt to quantify the welfare effects of this reduction. An effect is also seen at borders, where
the rivers are about 6% dirtier if at least one of the adjacent states is authorized. This coefﬁcient
too is statistically different than zero.
Column 2 in Table 2 alters the location variables to reﬂect proximity to the border. Far down-
stream of a border, the pollution endowment from upstream free riding dwindles with natural
attenuation; far upstream of a border, all the negative effects of pollution are experienced by the
polluting state. The second equation therefore considers stations to be upstream or downstream
of the border only if they are within 50 miles of the relevant border.13 This change substantially
reduces the number of stations classiﬁed as susceptible to free riding.
Nonetheless, the pattern observed above continues to hold. At downstream stations within 50
miles of the border, the upstream state’s authorization has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant
effect. The magnitude of the effect is similar to before. At upstream locations, authorization again
does not have a statistically signiﬁcant effect at 5%, although the positive coefﬁcient is statistically
signiﬁcant at 10%. However, only 9 stations identify the effect in this group, so the result is
somewhat anecdotal. With this change in other policy variables, the coefﬁcient on border state
authorization falls enough that it is no longer statistically different than zero, but the point estimate
remains negative.
Finally, the third column adds an interaction between the earlier variables that measure free
riding and the LCV score. States with greater preference for the environment might free ride less
than other states because they have higher existence values for environmental quality outside the
12This coefﬁcient also includes non-free-riding effects. If authorized states were different from other states (either
cleaner or dirtier), some of this difference would reach downstream neighbors. However, the direct test of the effect of
authorization does not show a consistent net effect of authorization, reducing this concern. In addition, the point values
of the own-state authorization coefﬁcient are positive, so this effect would tend to make the estimated coefﬁcient an
underestimate of true free riding.
13This ﬁgure was chosen based on the rates of attenuation for oxygen depletion. Setting a higher or lower threshold
(20 miles or 100 miles) did not greatly change the coefﬁcient estimates, although the number of stations identifying
the effect becomes quite small at 20 miles.
16state. They also might free ride more because they have more costly controls within the state and
therefore greater incentive to reduce these controls.14
The results in column 3 of Table 2 could be consistent with the former hypothesis. Upstream
state’s authorization and this variable interacted with the LCV score are jointly statistically signiﬁ-
cant at 5%. According to the point estimates, the effect of upstream state authorization is negative,
but a higher LCV score offsets this effect (although the latter coefﬁcient is not individually statis-
tically signiﬁcant). However, the individual coefﬁcients are so imprecisely estimated that they are
uninformative on the net effect. The coefﬁcients on authorization at an upstream station and its
interaction with LCV score show opposite effects, but are not jointly signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
This is surprising because the upstream coefﬁcients have smaller estimated standard errors than
the coefﬁcients at downstream stations.
Column 3 also provides some information about an alternative (non-free-riding) reason for
effects of proximity to borders. Kahn (2003) argues that pollution may be especially high just out-
side the borders of stringent states as facilities seek pollution havens with good access to markets
whose regulation they prefer to avoid. Similarly, pollution should be particularly low just inside
the borders of stringent states as activities near the border jump more readily to neighboring states
than those in the heart of the state. If green states use authorization to increase regulatory strin-
gency, therefore, Kahn’s hypothesis would suggest a positive coefﬁcient on the interaction between
authorization at an upstream location and LCV score, but the point estimate on this coefﬁcient is
negative.15 Thus, the estimates do not support Kahn’s hypothesis.
14Interactions are provided for upstream and downstream stations, but not stations on borders. Although an analo-
gous effect might be examined at borders, it is difﬁcult to deﬁne a single interaction variable for this case and seems
unwise to enter a number of interactions, given the small number of stations involved.
15Downstream of the border, the hypothesis does not yield a clear prediction. Although we would expect to see
diminished pollution inputs upstream with a authorized green upstream state, these would be counterbalanced by
higher inputs in the downstream state to which the polluting industries migrate.
173.2 Other coefﬁcients
Only a few of the other covariates enter the equations with statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients.
State personal income per capita does not have a statistically signiﬁcant effect. The estimated
coefﬁcient is positive, which would suggest that the effect of income on preferences dominates
its effect on uncontrolled pollution.16 The time-series variation in green preferences, as measured
by LCV scores of the state’s House delegation, also does not enter with statistically signiﬁcant
coefﬁcient, although the coefﬁcient is positive as expected. Changes over time in LCV scores
may be largely noise rather than underlying environmental preferences; in the cross-section, these
scores are positively associated with water quality. Since own state’s income and LCV scores do
not have statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients, it is not surprising that upstream states’ income and
LCV scores also do not seem to matter.
Neither of the land use measures, percent of the watershed in cropland or in urban uses, enters
statistically signiﬁcantly, although both have negative point estimates as expected. Again, when
the equations are estimated without station ﬁxed effects, these land use variables have a signiﬁcant
negative coefﬁcients. The failure to ﬁnd this effect with station ﬁxed effects probably results from
the relatively small variation over time in land use, making it difﬁcult to identify the effect of
changes. It could also be a data-quality issue: interpolation between inventories every ﬁfth year
may not adequately capture the time-series variation.
River ﬂow enters with a statistically signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient. The discussion above
suggested that ﬂow would have a positive effect on water quality because it indicates the amount
of dilution of a given amount of waste. However, ﬂoods dramatically increase nonpoint source
pollution (for example, with erosion of farmland), so the negative coefﬁcient likely results from
ﬂooding. Temperature does not enter with a statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient.
Finally, the time trend has a positive coefﬁcient in all equations, which may indicate that im-
plementation of CWA during this time did indeed improve water quality. The estimates are all
16I also ran the equations with a quadratic in income to allow the nonlinear relationship between income and pollu-
tion that some research has found. However, higher order terms were never statistically signiﬁcant, failing to support
an “environmental Kuznets curve” relationship in these data, even without ﬁxed effects.
18Table 3: Calculation of willingness to pay for water quality improvements in 1983
Current use Boatable Fishable
to boatable to ﬁshable to swimmable
Carson and Mitchell (1993) total WTP $93 $70 $78
Threshold WQI for water quality improvement 34.7 49.0 63.3
WQI units required to achieve threshold 26 339 1750
Estimated WTP per unit of WQI $3.55 $.21 $.04
Note: All dollar values in 1983 dollars per household.
Sources: Carson and Mitchell (1993) and calculations based on WQI at NASQAN stations in 1983.
around a .005 percent increase in the water quality index per year, so the cumulative effect over the
23 year period is substantial.
4 Welfare effects
An evaluation of the welfare effects of free riding requires information about the costs of water
pollution control and beneﬁts of water quality in upstream and downstream states. Upstream states
that free ride reduce their pollution control costs by more than the losses they bear from a lower
level of water quality in their state.17 Downstream states bear a burden both in environmental
damage and in pollution control costs, if they increase their control levels to offset the pollution
endowment they receive from upstream. Because this study does not have information on pollution
control costs, a complete evaluation of the welfare effects of observed free riding is outside its
scope. However, calculating the cost of environmental damage from free riding in downstream
states helps assess the magnitude of the effects estimated above.
A rough calculation of willingness to pay for improvements in the water quality index is shown
Table 3. The basis for the calculation is Carson and Mitchell’s national survey of the value of
recreational uses of freshwater in 1983 (Carson and Mitchell, 1993). As reported in the ﬁrst row
of Table 3, they estimate that households would be willing to pay an average of $93 to improve all
water from its 1983 condition to at least boatable, $70 to improve all water from at least boatable
17This statement assumes states adopt the in-state optimal pollution level, which is sufﬁcient but not necessary for
incentives to free ride.
19to at least ﬁshable, and $78 to improve all water from at least ﬁshable to swimmable (all values are
in 1983 dollars). Respondents attributed 67% of their values to in-state waters and the remainder
to out-of-state waters. Carson and Mitchell consider the in-state component to be use value and
the remainder to be existence value.
To use Carson and Mitchell’s results to value the WQI improvements estimated in the equations
requires calculating a willingness to pay per unit of WQI. The second row in Table 3 contains the
thresholds of the water quality index for boatable, ﬁshable, and swimmable rivers.18 Assuming
that the NASQAN stations are a representative sample of all relevant river locations, the third row
contains the number of WQI points necessary to meet each of the three goals nationally.19 Only
a small number of rivers start below boatable, so assuring boatable water requires far the smallest
total increase in WQI. Dividing Carson and Mitchell’s valuations by the WQI improvements in
the fourth row yields an estimate of average willingness to pay for a point of WQI in the different
use classes. These values are reported in the ﬁnal row of the table. Average values of WQI
improvements, as expected, decline as water quality improves. The rate of decline, however, is
surprisingly steep.
These willingness to pay values can then be applied to the difference between predicted water
quality with and without any authorization of upstream stations.20 Applying these averages as-
sumes that the value of improving only a share of waters is that share of the value of improving all
waters. This assumption may understate the value of partial improvements because the marginal
valuation probably declines with the share of water affected. I restrict the welfare estimate to the
67% of the value above attributable to in-state beneﬁts. For each state, the total value of WQI
improvements is multiplied by the number of households in 1983.
18The classiﬁcation uses thresholds provided by Bingham et al. (2000), less the requirement for BOD for which
NASQAN does not provide data. This classiﬁcation probably puts the thresholds too high because it depends on only
three of the ﬁve pollutants that are used as the basis for the water quality index. This misclassiﬁcation will tend to
underestimate the costs of free riding because of the higher value associated with improvements in dirtier rivers.
19NASQAN is not a representative sample and overrepresents river areas with human inﬂuence relative to all rivers.
However, this overrepresentation may be desirable in the current context because it is a sample of the areas likely to
be visited by people and thus to be included in the use values of rivers.
20I use willingness to pay from Carson and Mitchell as willingness to accept compensation for degradation from
free riding. This assumption may understates the values because willingness to accept often exceeds willingness to
pay by a large amount in survey data.
20Using the estimates in column 1 of Table 2, the result is an environmental cost to downstream
households of $17 million in 1983 (in that year’s dollars).21 For comparison, a recent study using
the same willingness-to-pay data placed the overall beneﬁts of CWA at $11 billion per year (Bing-
ham et al., 2000). The $17 million is only the environmental costs (not the costs of any pollution
abatement response), but does provide a lower bound on the losses at downstream stations.
5 Conclusion
The empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that states have both the will and the way to
free ride under Clean Water Act regulations. Federal policies that grant states authority to run their
own programs appear to allow free riding. By focusing on changes in policy regimes in upstream
states, the estimated equations address unobserved geographic heterogeneity that might otherwise
make it difﬁcult to isolate such effects.
Although such transboundary free riding is often cited as a justiﬁcation for federalizing envi-
ronmental policies, the results in this paper do not necessarily support more centralized policy for
three reasons. First, my empirical results suggest that federal standards do not prevent free riding.
Allowing states discretion in implementation and enforcement of standards appears to be sufﬁcient
for free riding to continue.22
Second, problems with free riding must be weighed against the beneﬁts of decentralization.
Because free riding costs only $17 million, it may not overcome the greater ﬂexibility and in-
formational advantages of decentralization. In addition, the optimal response to free riding may
not be centralization, but rather decentralization in combination with more targeted responses to
spillovers. For example, the federal government might continue to decentralize decision-making
but provide subsidies (or levy fees) on the chosen environmental standards to reﬂect costs to other
21These values would be different in other years. First, over time, beneﬁts of water quality improvements may
decline as water quality improves or increase with income. Second, expansion in authorized states would increase the
number of sites subject to free riding. Rather than stretch the beneﬁts transfer any further (for example, by assuming an
income elasticity for willingness to pay), the paper presents the values in the year for which they are most appropriate.
22Revesz (1996) observes that the Clean Air Act may similarly permit (or even encourage) free riding despite
centralized standards.
21states. However, Oates (2000) questions the political feasibility of such approaches.
Finally, free riding may not be detrimental if pollution control policies are inefﬁcient. Re-
cent studies suggest that CWA may not pass a cost-beneﬁt test (Freeman, 2000; Van Houtven et
al., 2000). If so, the observed free riding could provide a net beneﬁt by reducing overcontrol of
pollution.
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